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abstract: this paper exposes the relation between the different mathematical orientations, on 
the one hand, and the modes of documentary film on the other. When we take, with Badiou, 
mathematics as ontology, and mathematical orientations as orientations to Being, we find in 
the structural similarity of mathematics and documentary an equivalence between modes of 
documentary and mathematical-ontological decisions regarding the inscription of ‘what is’. From 
here we move to consider Badiou’s notion of ‘in-appearing’ through a reading of alain resnais’ 
documentary Night and Fog.
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From its very inception, cinema has grappled with the question of presentation, or 
being-there, versus representation. the lumière brothers’ early shorts or actuality films 
appeared, in the eyes of the first ‘naïve’ filmgoers, to present ‘life as it is’, dziga Vertov’s 
experimentation with the ‘Kino-eye’ and montage claimed to construct a more pen-
etrating window on reality via the harnessing of technology; neo-realism’s framing of 
the real broadened the conception of the field of presentation, and the (post)-modern 
filmmakers’ reflexive techniques challenged the very possibility of documenting reality. 
thus, it would seem that documentary plays in the fringes of the ontico-ontological divi-
sion, in the interstices between being as pure presentation, and being as appearing, the 
area that Badiou’s latest work in category theory seeks to explore. 
if documentary can be said to produce a world, it is because the filmmaker under-
takes an artistic procedure following a decision on existence. each different orientation 
raises the question of being as the director undertakes a commitment to present a real-
ity or ‘truth’ that the actual situation obscures. analogous to the case of foundational 
mathematical orientations, being as such is established following a particular axiomatic 
decision that shapes the presented universe in the light of certain artistic convictions, or 
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thought protocols. Badiou defines an artistic world as a ‘relation between the chaotic 
disposition of sensibility and form’.1 thus, the infinity of the material situation is given an 
order, or form, as a result of the artistic conviction, or vision, which can be understood 
as an ontological decision that orients the production of a truth that structures the par-
ticular being-there of the world produced by the documentary.
to be effective, art must take as its starting point that which empire does not rec-
ognize—its void—and build a truth process from its immanent distribution within its 
context such that its ‘in-existence’ is rendered visible, a de-structuring process that sheds 
particularity, returning to the ‘elemental’ level prior to the overlay of representation. 
this paradigm places empire in the position of knowledge, and figures the artistic 
truth procedure as radically disjunct. the purity of art stems from its ascetic separa-
tion, however: its purported aim, to ‘render visible to everyone that which, for empire 
(and so by extension for everyone, though from a different point of view) doesn’t exist’,2 
distinguishes between the state of the situation, and people’s inevitable captivation by 
the symbolic order. this is at the heart of Badiou’s injunction against the unthinking 
material re-production of existent (countable) elements of the state: ‘(w)hat there already 
is, the situation of knowledge as such, only gives us repetition. For a truth to affirm its 
newness, there must be a supplement’. the criterion of ‘novelty’ demands that each work 
must initiate a new mode of enquiry. if an artistic creation is not surprising, incalculable, 
unanticipatible, it merely reiterates knowledge, rather than exposing a truth. repetition 
is the mechanism by which the state regenerates, whereas art is charged with the pro-
duction of a generic singularity. 
documentary is engaged in the struggle to overcome mere repetition of the pro-
filmic or material world in front of the camera. its mandate is to produce a work of art 
that brings to appearance those elements of a situation that were previously foreclosed 
by current modes of representations as legislated by the state of the situation. thus, 
while we would seem to be dealing with re-presentation (in so far as documentary gains 
its special status via its manipulation of indexical traces), since its inception as a genre 
it has defined itself in terms of what it adds—a supplement, the space for a new appear-
ance. John grierson, in his canonical First Principles of  Documentary, deliberately excluded 
the ‘actuality film’ as one of the ‘lower forms’ because it was constructed largely of ‘natu-
ral materials’, arguing that ‘the only world in which documentary can hope to achieve 
the ordinary virtues of an art [is when] we pass from the plain (or fancy) descriptions of 
natural material, to arrangements, rearrangements, and creative shapings of it’.4 From 
this has grown a wide diversity of creative output and critical discussion, each hotly con-
1. alain Badiou, ‘the subject of art’, The Symptom, no. 6, spring 2005, http://www.lacan.com/symptom6_
articles/badiou.html
2. alain Badiou, ‘Fifteen theses on contemporary art’, Lacanian Ink, no. 2, 2004, pp. 100-19, p. 2.
. alain Badiou, ‘the ethic of truths: construction and potency’, trans. selma sowley, Pli: Warwick Journal 
of  Philosophy, no. 12, 2001, pp. 245-55, p. 250.
4. John grierson, First Principles of  Documentary quoted in philip rosen, Change Mummified: Cinema, Historicity, 
Theory, minneapolis, university of minnesota press, 2001, p. 2.
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testing the relation between reality, truth, objectivity and textuality. i am not presently 
concerned in establishing the validity of one particular stance in this complex debate; 
rather i would like to relate this whole discourse to Badiou’s elaboration of the different 
mathematical orientations that i see as similarly contesting the nature of ontology, and 
the appropriate means of approaching the formalization or construction of its objects. 
mathematicians and documentarists alike start from a foundational decision that ori-
ents the nature of the universe they set out to explore and determines the appearance 
of objects (mathematical or human) within the context of the delineated world. Just as 
Badiou argues for a single field of mathematics, wherein the different orientations (pla-
tonic, constructivist, generic etc.) bring various aspects of this infinite field into being as 
a result of the institution of protocols of thought, we can see how the documentary also 
forms particular instances of being-there which are similarly shaped by an orientation 
that derives from an artistic decision regarding what Is. 
traditional ontological approaches to the question of ‘being as being’, either take 
what desanti identifies as a maximalist approach, associated with empirical or logical 
readings whereby ‘being’ is adequate to its extensional concept, or, like Badiou, un-
dertake a minimalist reading and set out to think being in its being, without external 
reference to an extension5—the question of the ‘There is’ (il y a), or pure presentation. if 
being is to be treated within the its own, proper framework, the logical, or analytic ap-
proach that seeks to delineate an conceptual extension is excluded because it sets up an 
analogical relation that mediates between instances of being and pure being, while the 
contemporary linguistic turn in philosophy attempts to redress this problem by main-
taining the impossibility of re-presenting being or presence, and instead seeks the trace 
of being in poetry which retains a unique opening to presence without subjecting it to 
the violence of linguistic determinacy. the desire to think being ‘intrinsically’ leads Ba-
diou to reformulate the question within mathematical (or set-theoretical) terms, which 
means that to approach the thinking of being, we must also understand mathematics as 
a thought. Badiou turns to (ZF)6 set theory because it makes no existential claims, nor 
adds any extension, or predicate to its bare inscription of being.
re-reading lebniz’s maxim ‘What is not a being is not a being’ Badiou suggests that 
rather than this necessitating a Onenness of Being, and hence entailing predication, 
the singularization of a specific entity or multiple is always the result of an operation 
performed upon pure (inconsistent) multiplicity, and it is the operation of the count that 
structures it as one, or as a thing. 
in sum: the multiple is the regime of presentation; the one, in respect to presentation, 
5. i am grateful to Jean-toussaint desanti’s elaboration of this point in Jean-toussaint desanti, ‘some 
remarks on the intrinsic Ontology of alain Badiou’, in peter hallward (ed.), Think Again: Alain Badiou and 
the Future of  Philosophy, london, continuum Books, 2004, pp. 59-66.
6. Zermelo-Frankel set theory offers a first-order system built up from the primitive notion of belonging 
(∈), and which constructs its axiomatic framework from the void, or empty set {∅}. it makes no existential 
claims about the nature of sets, or their elements; in effect the system provides a means of describing 
the generation and organization of multiples, or sets, from nothing. it does not legislate over existential 
quantifiers (being specifically formulated to by-pass russell’s paradox).
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is an operational result; being is what presents (itself). On this basis, being is neither 
one (because only presentation itself is pertinent to the count-as-one), nor multiple 
because the multiple is solely the regime of presentation.
at the level of pure presentation all elements are simply registered on the level of 
‘belonging’ to the multiple/set, or are counted, such that ‘what is’ appears as presented 
consistency. if Being as pure inconsistent multiplicity is subtractive (there is no Whole, 
no One) and existence, or being-there is the result of an onto-logical ordering that falls 
within a different level, there is no way of substantiating ontological claims. it follows 
that any statements about Being must be founded upon pure decision, given its funda-
mental inaccessibility to presence as inconsistent (uncountable) multiplicity. Badiou’s 
interest in category theory lies in its ability to map the consequences of any decision 
regarding the nature of being and the conditions that structure its particular mathemati-
cal universe, allowing the logic of different orientations to be directly compared within 
a framework that is intrinsic to the ontological structures they describe. in particular, 
the absence of a meta-language is a strength of category theory that makes it compat-
ible with the minimalist approach to Being that Badiou adopts—all logical relations 
are intrinsically generated specific to the various mathematical worlds, mapping their 
potential existence, in terms of the different logics that structure the ‘being there’ or ap-
pearing of elements, within each world. 
thus, although there are different orientations, there is but a single mathematics 
whose domain is the inconsistent multiplicity, the very stuff of Being, that is able to be 
brought to presentation in various different ways, depending upon whether one up-
holds the constructivist conviction that all mathematical entities must be capable of 
being generated from a consistent, demonstrable axiomatic framework, whether the 
mathematician accepts unlimitable cardinality that is regulated by a separate axiomatic 
framework, or whether s/he allows generic sets, and therefore a subtractive notion of 
Being. Badiou turns to the significant impasses that have formed mathematical thought, 
such as the paradoxes of set theory or generic sets, to support his insight that these blind 
spots function as the real of mathematical thought, and the decisions arise from these 
areas of undecidability demonstrate the manner in which thought produces orientations 
that shape the various conceptions of existence: each decision on Being underwrites the 
foundations of the mathematical universe whose existence it declares.
in each case, it is a conflict in the thinking of Being, but on the level of existence, 
which Badiou glosses as that which ‘thought declares and whose consistency is guar-
anteed by Being’, is grasped differently in each case. since thought alone supports the 
foundational decision regarding an undecidable impasse, existence itself is the meeting 
point between ‘decision and encounter’, ‘act and discovery’, in other words, existence 
is produced by its particular thought: each decision axiomatically founds being via its 
initial inscription thereby determining the logic of its construction. the peculiar nature 
. alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham, london, continuum, 2005, p. 24 (henceforth Be).
. alain Badiou, Briefings On Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, trans. norman madarasz, albany, 
state university of new york press, 2006, pp. 45-5, p. 54 (henceforth tO).
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of such a decision entails both the positing of what is, and the paradoxical discovery 
of the structure of that existence, on the basis of this initial intuition/conviction. since 
this inaugural decision can have no grounding—being qua being is radically inaccessi-
ble—it is open to be thought in a range of orientations, but the conviction that is upheld 
in each orientation leads to the formulation of a potential being via its ‘fictive activa-
tion’: ‘existence is precisely Being itself in as much as thought decides it. and decision 
orients thought essentially’ (tO 55). the parmenidian insight ‘thinking and Being are 
One’ is demonstrated through the retroactive consistency that each orientation endows 
upon the mathematical universe declared to exist as a result of its particular thought. as 
Badiou notes: ‘… a position has to be taken. For we stand actually as an act (au pied de 
l’áct), if i dare say, upon the very norm of the decision the act accomplishes. // at any 
rate, what is referred to in this obligation to decide is Being’ (tO 52). 
Badiou’s latest work explores the process whereby mathematical decision on how 
the inconsistent stuff of Being can be brought to presentation, ordered, or numbered pro-
duces a framework of possible entities, or that forms being according to certain concep-
tual convictions. if, as Badiou suggests, the divergent mathematical decision to attribute 
existence can be metaphorically mapped with the three different political orientations 
that dominate contemporary society (tO 55-6), it would seem plausible to extend this 
analogy to the field of art which, broadly speaking, is similarly oriented relative to the 
three modes of thinking Being: constructivist, transcendent and generic. 
the constructivist/intuitionist approach limits mathematical thinking of Being to 
a ‘logical grammar’ (Be 2) with origins that are traceable back to the aristotelian 
rebuttal of platonic ideality. aristotle’s proposal that mathematics is ultimately a branch 
of aesthetics rests on his conviction that mathematical thought consists of a ‘fictive ac-
tivation’ of objects that have only potential existence in the realm of the sensible and 
thus deals with questions of order and symmetry, governed by a norm of the beauti-
ful. this power to ‘inseparate the inseparable’ (tO 4) Badiou equates with language, 
and the various inscriptions of Being that dominate the thinking of mathematics today. 
For example, the aesthetic principle underpins the conviction that mathematics ‘tells us 
nothing of real-being, but it forges a fiction of intelligible consistency from the stand-
point of the latter, whose rules are explicit’ (tO 4). thus, mathematics is reduced to a 
consistent set of rules and structures rather than being the science of Being qua Being: 
‘thought subsumes the relation to being within the dimension of  knowledge’ (Be 29). the 
constructivist limits the set universe within which operations can be carried out to the 
class model of ‘constructible sets’. this is characterized as a ‘thin’ set universe, in that 
it is generated from a spine of ordinals from which all the counting operations which 
are concretely constructible are appended. such a model produces a universe that is as 
‘tall’ as any potential universe, in that it contains the ordinals up to infinity, but it does 
not fully utilize the power set axiom, which would theoretically generate all potential 
subsets of a given ordinal, and so exhaust the combinatorial abilities inherent within the 
system. in the thin set universe, these denumerable subsets are not included, only those 
which can be directly counted are added on to the spine of ordinals. such an omission 
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is acceptable in that the continuum hypothesis is unprovable within ZF which remains 
consistent with and without its addition. 
however, this opens the question as to the nature of the resulting set universe ‘l’ 
(known as the ‘class of constructible sets’) relative to the infinity of sub-sets capable of 
generation under the power set axiom, giving rise to the complete universe of sets ‘V’, 
designated as the ‘real world’. One would intuitively assume that the latter is much 
larger than the thin set universe (l), however, the axiom of constructability states V = 
l, and has been shown to be consistent. From V = l the existence of a minimal model 
can be consistently assumed, however, this in effect conditions the boundaries of the set 
universe relative to the language in which it is accessible. at this juncture, mathemat-
ics is encountering the Wittgensteinian dictum ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must be silent’.9 
Badiou links this approach to Being with the neo-classical norms in art, that privi-
lege continuity: ‘the neo-classicist fulfils the precious function of the guardianship of 
sense on a global scale. he testifies that there must be sense’ (Be 292). in terms of docu-
mentary, if we think the condition of existence being determined by constructibility, or 
conditioned by language, textuality, we can include those directors that privileged the 
structuring of the film as the means of producing a consistent construction of existence. 
We can relate this to pudovkin and Kuleshov’s conception of montage as an unfolding 
sequence built out of separate filmic elements that were placed together, piece by piece, 
to depict a specific narrative sequence.10 this approach can be seen as a forerunner of 
what Bazin identified as the ‘transparent’ technique of classical hollywood cinema in 
the 40’s. Film theorist philip rosen has remarked the joint emergence of the classical 
fiction film along side the new documentary genre, suggesting that many of the con-
ventions of sequencing and narratorial regulation of the latter resulted from this newly 
established viewing practice. this is most closely realized in robert Flaherty’s Nanook 
of  the North (widely accepted as founding the genre) which was structured along classical 
narrative lines. the daily existence of the inuits captured on film was a reality produced 
especially for and by the film. most scenes were staged, and the dramatic structure 
collaboratively predetermined between Flaherty and nanook. Broadly speaking, the 
thought that underwrites the treatment of appearing within this orientation aims to deal 
with that which can be shown—to close off aporia, making the diegetic world seam-
less. at this point, constructivism can be equated with textuality—there is no ‘real’ to 
which the film/mathematical proposition refers, only the manipulation of signification 
within a conventionally governed framework that allows the production of meaning. as 
9. ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. c.K. Ogden, london, routledge and Kegan 
paul, 1922.
10. dziga Vertov’s ‘Kino-pravda’ uses montage in an entirely different manner: the use of split screen, 
superimpositions and rapid montage to produce a ‘truth’ that only the superior technological resources 
of film could capture, distances him from the more conventional constructivist stance. a full discussion 
of Vertov’s contribution the development of the documentary genre is beyond the scope of this present 
article.
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Badiou comments: ‘the constructible universe is […] the ontological symbol of knowl-
edge. the ambition which animates this genre of thought is to maintain the multiple 
within the grasp of what can be written and verified. Being is only admitted to being 
within the transparency of signs which bind together its derivation on the basis of what 
we have already been able to inscribe’ (Be 09). that construction is commensurate 
with knowledge is a dangerous proposal, as evidenced in the colonialist overtones of 
early anthropological documentary. For instance, Fatimah tobing rony has critiqued 
Flaherty’s Nanook for its ‘romantic preservationism’, viewing its appropriation of the inuit 
lifestyle as a fetishization of Otherness (‘ethnographic taxidermy’) and the deliberate 
production of a nostalgic fiction.11 the contemporary rejection of the traditional om-
niscience of the documentarist/ethnographer nevertheless retains a self-conscious con-
structivist approach. as cool and lutkenhaus suggest, ‘although these enthnographies 
take a number of different forms, they share a self-conscious effort to portray the socially 
constructed nature of ethnographic knowledge’12 (my italics). this overtly ethical stance 
nevertheless foregrounds the textuality implicit in its ideological orientation, reflecting 
what Badiou has termed the ‘ethic of knowledge’: ‘act and speak such that everything 
be clearly decidable’ (Be 14).
For Badiou, art enters into an antagonistic relation to the dominant cultural re-
gime which he terms ‘empire’, and he frames the goal of art as the production of ab-
stract, non-imperial works that achieve the generic universality common to each of 
the truth processes. in this context, knowledge is equated directly with the generalized 
meta-structure, and Badiou writes: ‘since it is sure of its ability to control the entire do-
main of the visible and the audible via the laws governing commercial circulation and 
democratic communication, empire no longer censures anything’.1 this means that 
the drawback of any constructivist stance is its limitation to the realm of knowledge, 
which is governed by the state of the situation/empire. While any post-modern docu-
mentary that interrogates the repression and appropriation at play in any construction 
of social/racial/gender within its own framework as an artistic artefact, as well as the 
wider social context with which it engages is foregrounding the play of signification and 
its incommensurability with knowledge, its paradoxical reliance upon the properties of 
language to do so is nevertheless, from Badiou’s perspective, a limitation. it precludes 
the possibility of an event, and denies the possibility of a (subtractive) truth, in favour of 
an endlessly disseminating relativity. 
the attraction of such an approach is nevertheless appealing, and, within discus-
sions of documentary practice, the insight that the work is a ‘text’ rather than a slice of 
reality has been extremely influential. Badiou accounts for this ‘linguistic turn’ by not-
ing that the totalizing force of empire is not manifestly repressive: rather than imposing 
11. Fatimah tobing rony, The Third Eye: Race: Cinema and the Ethnographic Spectacle, durham, duke university 
press, 1996, p. 102.
12. nancy lutkehaus and Jenny cool, ‘paradigms lost and Found’, in Jane gaines and michael renov 
(eds.), Collecting Visible Evidence, minneapolis, university of minnesota press, 1999, p. 11.
1. Badiou, ‘Fifteen theses on contemporary art’.
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an openly dogmatic program against which an artist might strive to retrieve the light 
of truth, the contemporary situation is unremittingly permissive, urging its subjects to 
‘consume, to communicate and to enjoy’14, in effect fusing with the super-egoic injunc-
tion to ‘enjoy!’ such that one is bound by the duty to indulge. the granting of absolute li-
cence binds the subject more tightly within the transparent operations of its regime. the 
meta-statist strangle-hold currently saturates the situation to the extent that it is always 
already in excess of any new artistic configurations that might be formed—the structure 
is capable of anticipating all potential developments within the elements it regulates. 
against a regime that performs a perversely Foucauldian discipline of surveillance, 
that exercises absolute control over the domain of the visible and the audible such that 
nothing is censured simply because nothing can be produced that is outside the param-
eters of its control, Badiou turns to the force of the subtractive as the only space that is 
outside governance. to this end, his theses on contemporary art focus on the process of 
the generic, and the technique of purification. art becomes possible at the point which 
the individual resists the imperative to enjoy (and hence participate), and practices a 
rigorous asceticism both in the personal realm, becoming ‘the pitiless censors of our-
selves’, and in the refusal to (re-)produce in the service of the state. indeed, ‘[i]t is better 
to do nothing than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that 
which empire already recognizes as existent’.15 in a constructivist orientation, all sets are 
always already constructible, hence there is no space for the ‘new’ to emerge: nothing to 
challenge the prevailing regime. a self-conscious or post-modern incorporation of this 
maxim does not destabilize this state of affairs as it is simply a reflexive re-configuration 
of that which is already counted, or controlled. Whatever can be (ac)counted for is by 
definition always already within the governance of empire, and is indeed sanctioned as 
yet another means of proliferating its meta-structural control. 
Badiou identifies a second mathematical orientation, which he terms prodigal or 
transcendent. the finitude of the constructivist orientation is superseded in set theoreti-
cal terms by the introduction of inaccessible cardinals, which he claims serve to intro-
duce a ‘theological’ transcendence that breaks down the maxim of constructability via 
the positing of ordinals that cannot be reached from within the limits of the construct-
ible universe. in this orientation V ≠ l. rather than work from the finite set universe 
towards its potential limit, the transcendent orientation works from the unquantifiable 
cardinals towards the constructible universe. this orientation revives cantor’s original 
theological insight, maintaining the undecidability of such cardinals from within ZF. Ba-
diou discusses this in terms of different ‘species’ of multiple being—the successor ordi-
nal, that has a local status and is identifiable within V, whereas the limit ordinal ‘ex-sists 
from the sequence whose limit it is’ (Be 155), and has a global status. the existence of 
large cardinals rests on a decision of thought, which produces a divergent mathematical 
orientation that conceives of the mathematical universe as far exceeding the part that 
has currently been formalized by its theorists. although the positing of an ‘indiscernible’ 
14. Badiou, ‘Fifteen theses on contemporary art’.
15. Badiou, ‘Fifteen theses on contemporary art’.
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breaks the tyranny of the language/knowledge dyad, Badiou remarks its negative con-
notations, such that it indicates the inability of exact nomination, whereas the generic 
positively designates the truth of a situation that is incommensurable with knowledge.
We can compare this thinking of being with the neo-realist movement, which pro-
poses a similarly transcendent ‘Wholeness’ of reality that the totalizing gaze of the cam-
era brings to appearance. the unflinching recording of the detail of the everyday brings 
to presentation a deeper understanding of the local, producing a ‘description of reality 
conceived as a whole by a consciousness disposed to see things as a whole’,16 a conscious-
ness that andre Bazin, has described as properly ‘ontological’. the crucial difference 
is that meaning is constructed a posteriori, from the cumulative effect of the fragments 
of reality it juxtaposes, rather than aiming to construct a particular argument from the 
fragments by their deliberate arrangement. While such films are nevertheless crafted 
artefacts, and as such prey to the same dictates of textuality, Bazin suggested that neo-
realism presented ‘documentary reality plus something else, this something else being 
the plastic beauty of the images, the social sense, or the poetry, the comedy and so on’.1 
Badiou links this valorization of transcendence with heidegger’s notion of the Open, 
and indeed Bazin’s appeal to the intangible evocation of the real via ‘poetry’ certainly 
speaks to this desire to locate a trace of being as such. 
neorealism’s belief in the truth inherent in uncontrolled events countered the ear-
lier use of documentary to produce a subjective, personal truth whereby random, un-
predictable happenings were retroactively re-framed within a larger structure of gov-
ernance, by editing and voice over narrative. Knowledge/language is exceeded by the 
intervention of the real, here indicated by the poetic trace that lends a teleological 
transcendence to the artistic world of the film. Badiou dismisses the heideggerian ap-
peal to poetry as the conduit to access the withdrawal of Being, equating it with the 
chimera of the inconsistent multiple that becomes retroactively thinkable as a result of 
the operation that brought the consistent multiple to presentation. there is no ineffable 
‘Whole’ of being.
this same appeal to totality can be seen in the French cinéma vècu, where the docu-
mentarists’ immersion in a particular way of life and the subsequent recording of tes-
timonies claimed to produce an excess of truth. likewise, direct cinema, and Cinéma 
Vérité were influenced by neorealism’s drive to present a more ‘complete’ reality, intro-
ducing such diverse techniques such as the hidden camera, the provocative onscreen 
interview, or a narrowed focus on the ‘crisis’ structure, in a bid to capture the full ‘event’ 
as it unfolded. this belief in the camera’s ability to capture the ‘real nature of the world’ 
soon came to be widely challenged by theorists and film makers alike. as documenta-
rist James lipscome notes: ‘we cannot assume as c-v seems to, that there is a universal 
or absolute truth about objects and events—and thus we must face up to the fact that, 
16. andre Bazin, ‘in defence of rossellini: a letter to guido aristarco, editor-in-chief of cinema nuovo’, 
What is Cinema?, trans. hugh gray, Berkeley, university of california press, 191, p. 9.
1. Bazin, ‘in defence of rossellini’, p. 100.
cOsmOs and histOry250
to paraphrase euclid on mathematics, there is no royal road to the real nitty-gritty’.1 
Which brings us to Badiou’s third mathematical orientation, that of the generic.
the construction of a generic extension entails a positive mapping of an indiscern-
ible part of a situation—an excrescence—via an infinite truth procedure that verifies, 
element by element, those aspects which can be said to have a positive connection to 
the event and those which do not. the crux of this procedure is that the elements of 
this indiscernible part are all named within the prevailing knowledge of the situation, 
but the generic set that results forms a diagonal to the current representational norms, 
including at least one element that does not share an identifiable property with the rest 
of the infinite set to which it belongs, making the generic set indiscernible from within 
the situation insofar as it evades nomination. this indiscernibility is precisely that which 
characterizes the set as generic since its property is solely the fact of its being in the situ-
ation, and does not refer to its classification within language, as per the other construct-
ible sets. it is this that allows the construction of the ‘being-multiple’ of a truth, insofar 
as the enquiry focuses on being, and its suture to the void, rather than on veridical de-
terminations: what ‘we are looking for is an ontological differentiation between the true 
and the veridical, that is between truth and knowledge’ (Be ).
the generic art-idea is not included in the presented work, simply because the param-
eters of space and time within which it is produced constrain the material artefact to 
finitude. Badiou’s emphatic insistence that: ‘[…] the work of art is in fact the only finite 
thing that exists—that art creates finitude’19 derives its justification from the greek aes-
thetic principle of completion, in which perfection and completion are co-determinate. 
thus the single work of art cannot be coextensive with a truth procedure as this would 
repeat the romantic error of seeing art as the privileged site of the incarnation of the 
infinite within the finite. Badiou’s inaesthetic schema figures the relation between art 
and truth as being both singular and immanent:
art itself is a truth procedure. Or again: the philosophical identification of art falls 
under the category of truth. art is a thought in which artworks are the real (and 
not the effect). (hi 9)
an artistic truth is immanent to the work of art and is constructed from the unlocat-
able point of the void: we are dealing with a subtraction that bears witness to the reduc-
tive exigency of the structuring regime of the count-for-one. the first axiom of Badiou’s 
‘Fifteen theses on contemporary art’ states: ‘art […] is the production of an infinite sub-
jective series, through the finite means of a material subtraction’.20 parsing this in terms 
of its mathematical context, we can understand each point, or element, as the site of an 
enquiry as to whether it can be said to be a member of the generic sub-set, given that 
there is no unifying predicate that determines membership (since the generic set/truth 
1. James. lipscome, ‘correspondence and controversy: cinéma Vérité’, Film Quarterly, vol. 1, 1964, pp. 
62-.
19. alain Badiou, Handbook of  Inaesthetics, trans. alberto toscano, stanford, stanford university press, 2005, 
p. 11 (henforth hi).
20. Badiou, ‘Fifteen theses on contemporary art’.
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is infinite it remains untotalizable). as such, the modality of any particular truth lies in 
the future anterior—what will have been true— a wager that founds the undertaking of the 
process and so brings the possibility of that truth into being as the ‘infinite result of a 
risky supplementation’.21
the truth of any single presented multiple is that which ‘from inside the presented, 
as part of this presented, makes the inconsistency—which buttresses in the last instance 
the constancy of the presentation—come into the light of day’ (mp 106). thus, the truth 
of a work of art is an immanent, but anonymous aspect of its material presentation, 
retrospectively readable as the operation that formed its finite consistency: a constitu-
tive aspect that is not strictly commensurate within its spatio-temporal context, but is a 
rem(a)inder of the creative process itself. 
the generic orientation, then, ‘explore[s] how, from a given situation, one can con-
struct another situation by means of the ‘addition’ of an indiscernible multiple of the 
initial situation’. this approach can be metaphorically linked to the documentary style 
of alain resnais, whose landmark documentary, Night and Fog, undertakes the bring-
ing-to-‘appearance’ of those aspects of the holocaust that continue to be ‘invisible’ (or 
‘indiscernible’) from the perspective of the state, creating a form that is adequate to the 
investigation of that which is most properly formless. What i am identifying as a ‘generic 
truth procedure’ is the painstaking manner in which the elements of the situation are 
‘counted’, both according to the prevailing regime of knowledge and, simultaneously, as 
being included within a separate (what Badiou would call ‘excrescent’) part of that same 
situation that is indiscernible from within the governing norms of representation. thus, 
resnais’ documentary can be said to construct a generic set that cuts a diagonal across 
the veridical truth of the situation, initiating an on going interrogation of the foreclosed 
aspects of an immanent truth. much as the generic set cannot be totalized and therefore 
is resistant to being simply added to the constructible set universe (since such nomina-
tion would destroy its being as generic), resnais’ work does not set out to present the 
truth of the holocaust. however, by his serial interrogation of the material traces, he 
seeks to extract immanent fragments from which he constructs his truth procedure. this 
leads us to suggest that resnais’ orientation, or manner of ‘thinking of being’ avoids the 
pitfalls of constructivism: since the localized truth of the holocaust is precisely the un-
thought of the situation, it cannot simply be brought to representation, since it ex-ists as 
its real. in other words, it exceeds V=l. it is equally apparent that resnais’ work does 
not seek to evoke a transcendent truth of the holocaust—a temptation to which many 
contemporary ethical theorists fall prey,22 rather, he departs from a formalization which 
allows him to interrogate the excess of the real over the governance of representation. it 
is this subtractive approach that makes resnais’ work analogous to Badiou’s mathemati-
21. alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. norman madarasz, albany, state university of new york 
press, 1999, pp. 106- (henceforth mp).
22. Badiou distances himself from the contemporary ‘ethical’ stance in philosophical thinking that valorizes 
the victim, and seeks to make suffering sacred. resnais’ documentary avoids this stance, framing a political 
challenge to think the truth of the holocaust in order to prevent its recurrence.
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cal orientation. We shall return to resnais’ film shortly, as i undertake an exploration of 
the capacity of category theory to offer a more nuanced reading of localized being-there 
within the diegetic world(s) of the documentary. 
While set theory remains the proper means of inscribing being as being, it does not 
offer any insight into how particular beings interact within a particular context, thus Ba-
diou’s latest work turns to category theory to provide a means of mapping the structure 
of any localized section of being—or a way of thinking the ‘appearing’ of a world. in 
particular, topos theory affords the means of explicating the plurality of ‘worlds’, since 
it models the structural determination of all potential situations, or topoi, rather than 
providing a global regulatory framework that accounts for a single, totalized Being. in 
terms of mathematics/ontology, this means it can map the set universe that holds for 
the different thought orientations or ‘decisions’ taken by the working mathematician, 
providing a consistent map of the relations that structure the universe following certain 
axiomatic presuppositions.
traditionally, we have approached the question of world from the point of view of a 
being and their degree of consciousness of, or relation to it. category theory by-passes 
this binary subject/object relation, placing the emphasis on the relation itself as the 
active component that effectively gives the being its capacity for appearing, legislating 
its mode of being there—the donation of place. a ‘world’ is a topos delineated by a finite 
series of identifications and operations. the anchor for all relations stems from the Void, 
as the only multiple-being that has no elements as is thus immediately determined.2 all 
other multiples are made up of elements, which means that the multiple itself is deter-
mined according to its elements.24 
[…] one calls ‘world’ (for those operations) a multiple-being such that, if a 
being belongs to it, every being whose being is assured on the basis of the 
first—in accordance with the aforementioned operations—belongs to it equally.  
 thus, a world is a multiple-being closed for certain derivations of being.25
‘World’ in this sense, is properly speaking, the situation, or localized context within 
which the operation that allows a being to appear-there is performed. this formal con-
dition of ‘appearing’ or becoming locally situated is extrinsic to the proper Being of an 
essent, but which allows an aspect of its Being to appear a certain way, as conditioned by 
its contingent network of (multiple) relations.26 something can only be said to ‘appear’ 
2. alain Badiou, ‘the transcendental’, Theoretical Writings, trans. ray Brassier and alberto toscano, 
london, continuum Books, 2004, pp. 19-220, p. 191.
24. since all of these operations are contingent on the void as the only immediately determined being, it is 
theoretically possible to produce an ontological rank, relative to the multiple’s distance from its origin, or 
the number of operations performed in its composition. however, since there is no whole of Being, there 
can be no single scale upon which multiple being can be ordered—there are multiples whose construction 
does not intersect with other multiples outside the single shared foundational set of the void. this cancels 
the possibility of any global uniformity, or categorization of beings: identifications and relations are always 
local. it is this property that Badiou exploits in his definition of ‘world’.
25. Badiou, ‘the transcendental’, p. 192.
26. it is important to note that the operation is dependent upon the place: without an ontologically presented 
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in a world if it participates in a relation with another being within the same localized 
context. thus an object x can be expressed on an ontological level as a pure multiple, 
using a set theoretical framework, but this makes no existential claims. as Badiou notes 
‘[w]hen x is said mathematically the possible and real become indiscernible’.2 if we 
want to claim that x exists, it has to be situated (x belongs to s). thus, existence is not 
an attribute of x alone, but is a function of its relation to s, hence what Badiou terms 
‘appearance’ is ‘what is thinkable about x in so far as it belongs to s’.
it is important to note that the being-ness of an existent is always thinkable relative 
to the situation within which it is embedded. since being itself is not-all, then ‘[b]eing 
is only exposed to thought as a local site of its untotalizable unfolding’ (tO 15-6, 161) 
indeed, determination itself can only be understood in a relative sense, since the essent 
must be situated in order to show its ‘beingness’. the morphisms of a situation form 
the objects that make up its map, thus any instance of ‘being there’ does not derive its 
attributes from the ontological manifold, but relative to the onto-logic of its context. 
hence Badiou’s focus on ‘appearing’, which he argues is an intrinsic determination of 
Being:
appearing is the site, the ‘there’ (là) of the multiple-existent insofar as it is thought 
in its being. appearing in no way depends on space or time, or more generally on 
a transcendental field. it does not depend on a subject whose constitution would 
be presupposed. the manifold-being does not appear for a subject. instead, it is 
more in line with the essence of the existent to appear. (tO 162)
this leads to the paradoxical overturning of the platonic binary of appearance and ide-
ality, since the immediate or given world is a world that is intimately structured, a web of 
relations and intensities, that stabilize the inconsistency of multiple-being within a deter-
minate, situated logic. in contrast, the world of idealities—as inscribed by set theory—is 
a space of disjunction and absolute differentiation, a ‘sense-deprived’ rationality that 
lays down the composition of manifolds in an axiomatic austerity. the practical applica-
tions of categorical analysis remain to be established. in terms of film studies it affords 
the possibility of mapping the appearing of elements within a given diegetic world, and 
in particular, the ‘in-appearing’ of those elements that would (potentially) be included 
within the construction of a generic extension. 
multiple, there is nothing which can be located via the onto-logical operation. as we have seen, a world is 
constituted by a sequence of operations that map relations from an already existent being to a second being 
that is thinkable with respect to the first. the operation itself does not ‘exist’, but is inferred relative to the 
new point that is nameable as a result of its action. thus: ‘[w]e call “situation of being”, for a singular being, 
the world in which it inscribes a local procedure of access to its being on the basis of other beings’. the onto-
logical operation actualizes possible formations within the different multiples of presentation and allows 
them to appear within a localized context. the being of these elements insists prior to their actualization; 
the operation one-ifies them, by linking them in a network of relations that establish degrees of difference 
and identity within the presented situation. these values are not absolute, i.e. they are not ontological, thus 
the ‘same’ element can be appear concurrently (and therefore differently) in a variety of worlds.
2. alain Badiou, ‘notes toward thinking appearance’, Theoretical Writings, trans. ray Brassier and alberto 
toscano, london, continuum Books, 2004, p. 11.
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alain resnais’ documentary, Night and Fog, can be approached as a meditation on 
‘appearing’, explored through the disjunctive worlds of the Jews in the concentration 
camps, the germanic ‘Volk’, and the present day world of the viewer. While the po-
tency of Blanchot’s writings on the disaster remain unparalleled in providing a nuanced 
insight into the destitution of subjectivity and the peculiar timelessness of the event, 
Badiou’s framework adds an invaluable commentary on the logic of the situation—the 
lack of mediating phenomenological consciousness2 in the categorical framework para-
doxically enables one to think the relational complexity of the different worlds, without 
inflicting the violence of determining the being of any of those who suffered this inap-
prehensible experience. Badiou’s onto-logic describes the being-there, or the degrees of 
intensity of appearance of any single being within a given situation—it does not make 
judgement regarding their actual Being, since each essent has the potential to appear 
in a variety of ways, and in multiple situations. it remains important to underline that 
the holocaust itself does not figure as an ‘event’ for Badiou, primarily because it is a 
product of the nazi’s political agenda. the ideology of the third reich is identified as a 
simulacrum of an event, and as such serves as a paradigm of evil.
the opening shots of Night and Fog introduce the antagonistic multiples, or ‘enve-
lopes’29 of a world, that will structure the film. the present day site of what will be 
revealed as the former concentration camp, shot in colour and accompanied by the 
light-hearted flute music (scored especially for the film by hans eisler) is introduced as 
a ‘tranquil landscape’. the camera then pans down to include the stark outline of an 
electric fence that cuts across the harmony of the landscape, dividing the screen with a 
gesture which seems to signal a rupture, or a ‘disjunctive’ conjunction between this ele-
ment and the rest, since they are situated within a single world (they each appear within 
the film frame) yet the common element of their respective intensities of appearance is 
2. Badiou stresses that his own demonstrations of the applicability of categorical logic are largely allegorical, 
retaining a ‘vulgar’ phenomenological slant, whereas in fact ‘[t]his entire arrangement can do without my 
gaze, without my consciousness, without my shifting attention…’ (alain Badiou, Theoretical Writings, ed. and 
trans. ray Brassier and alberto toscano, london, continuum Books, 2004, p. 20.). my own analysis 
follows Badiou’s mapping of the terrain. to take full advantage of category theory’s departure from the 
privileging of consciousness it remains necessary to theorize the construction of worlds within the diegetic 
framework, and concurrently map their relation to the world(s) of the spectator. in the case of Night and Fog, 
the film addresses an audience on the tenth anniversary of WWii, which has to be factored in alongside the 
viewing present of each particular screening. i am particularly interested in how category theory might lead 
us to re-think specularity and appearance outside traditional matrixes of spectatorship.
29. the highest value of the synthesis of the total network of relations that form the consistency of a section 
of being-there is termed its ‘envelope’: ‘the regional stability of a world comes down to this: if you take a 
random fragment of a given world, the beings that are there in this fragment possess—both with respect 
to themselves and relative to one another—differential degrees of appearance which are indexed to the 
transcendental order within this world. […] Consequently, we call ‘envelope’ of  a part of  the world, that being whose 
differential value of  appearance is the synthetic value appropriate to that part’. (Badiou, ‘the transcendental’, p. 20.). 
in other words, the envelope is the value of the composite intensities of appearances within a given segment 
of a world, and as such it provides a global stability to this section that underpins all appearances, even those 
with zero-value, as this lack of appearance is still a ration that maintains its relation to the envelope itself, 
and hence is included as a non-appearance.
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nil—it approaches the minimum value of appearance within a part of being. While the 
film would seem to be setting up an emblematically disjunctive relation between what it 
identifies as the ‘closed world’ of the camp, and the ‘tranquil landscape’ surrounding it, 
topos theory allows us to approach this differently: despite the effective (and deliberate) 
lack of appearance of the camp from the situation of the free world, it nevertheless is 
demonstrably present as an element of that world, but one that in-appears. it is precisely 
this paradox of effacement and inclusion that we will be exploring. 
the operation that regulates the appearing of beings does not guarantee that every 
element of a multiple be granted a place according to the governing transcendental.0 
as we have seen, since there is no Whole of Being, the very fact of localization means 
that the placement of beings is similarly ‘not-all’. thus, we need to account for this ‘zero 
degree’ of appearance, one which falls within the operating logic that structures a given 
situation without actually designating a place of ‘being-there’. Badiou speaks of a logical 
mark, or index of non-appearance, an inscription of absence. moreover, this being that 
lacks a situation of appearing is fundamental as the lower limit against which all other 
appearances in the transcendental envelope are to be measured, providing a stable scale 
against which the variations, or degree of beings draw their meaning. it is important 
to bear in mind that situational difference between elements is simply a question of the 
intensity with which they appear in relation to all the other elements within that world: 
there is no absolute measure of appearance, or appearance ‘in itself ’. this being given, 
an element with ‘zero degree’ appearance within a world is one with the least degree of 
relation with all other elements, thus, from the perspective of that particular world, it is 
not ‘there’: it is an element in the multiple being on the ontological level, but from the 
onto-logical perspective of the situation itself, it is not present.1 
0. the transcendental provides a basic ordering of a situation, stemming from a series of measures that 
determine the relations between the elements that comprise the situation. it is important to note that 
the transcendental is itself a multiple that orders and self-regulates: the situation itself is not ordered. the 
transcendental determines the conditions under which its elements operate within the specific, localized 
appearance. in moving from the potential real to the actual, we are tracing a reconfiguration of identity 
from a formal, singular mode, to a contingent, relational mode. the same set, and the same elements 
could appear as or in a wide context of situations, and as such their governing transcendental would vary 
according to the different constitution of worlds.
1. to bring out this crucial distinction, Badiou offers an example of natural numbers, which we have already 
established consist of transitive ordinals and contain their own logic of succession—thus their ontological 
status is given. however, when we turn to an instance of their use within an empirical situation, such as 
the numbering of the pages of a book, whilst their intrinsic being remains unaltered, it becomes possible to 
make claims about their varying degrees of appearance. any page number participates in the situation of 
the book, and is governed by a transcendental logic that relates each number to the rest in terms of their 
sequencing. Within this, it is evident that some numbers appear more intensely than others—for example 
the chapter numbers that are singled out in the index and form a separate sub-set of extra-significant 
numbers, a difference that gives them a higher value of appearance since these are the ones to which all the 
other numbers in that respective chapter are related. similarly, numbers that do not correspond to a given 
page (say, ) can be said to have zero-appearance within this situation—whilst ontologically they share 
the same being as other ordinals, or natural numbers, within this finite situation of appearing their relation 
is minimal (Badiou, ‘the transcendental’, p. 21).
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While the wire fence does not seem to appear within the envelope of the rural 
world, their juxtaposition entails a re-configuring of the topos. the widening of the con-
text allows a re-calibration of the network of relations, and what Badiou calls the ‘global 
unity’ of the section of the world is reconstituted to allow for its conjunction with the 
totality of its elements. this degree of relation, then, is calculated in terms of the value 
of the conjunction between the wire fence and the synthesis of the value of its relations 
to all of the apparents within the envelope of the tranquil landscape, considered case by 
case. in our current example, the train tracks that appeared with a lm degree of inten-
sity within the initial rural configuration, when taken in conjunction with the wire fence 
immediately take on a maximal degree of appearance, since they change from being 
part of a sleepy rural railroad, to being implicated in the deportation of the Jews—the 
path that anticipates the link between the two different worlds of the camps and the free 
world. this gesture is to be repeated throughout the film, as the routine of the present 
which initially seems removed from the inarticulable horrors of the camps, is re-con-
nected to this unquantifiable multiple, demonstrating over and again the logical relation 
that binds the two as a single world. the documentary foregrounds the formal difficulty 
of being present-to that which remains subtracted from nomination, or representation, 
while paradoxically underlining the insistence of that which ‘in-appears’ within the cur-
rent situation.
certainly, the documentary foregrounds the intercalary relation between the ‘tran-
quil landscape’ and the camp site: grass has overgrown the tell-tale tracks, and the literal 
sites of the atrocities seem softened by the summer sunshine, the crumbling buildings 
ironically becoming almost picturesque such that, the narrator informs us, the crema-
torium has become the subject of postcards and snapshots. the buildings that housed 
the subjugated now appear bland, neutral, baldly refusing any appearance of extraor-
dinariness that one feels events ought to have inscribed upon their surface. this aura 
of specious normality is taken up by the narration that details the production, planning 
and construction of the camps, undertaken as pragmatically as if they were any ‘hostel 
or stadium’, with ‘estimates, bids, bribes’. the black and white documentary footage 
that accompanies this section again fails to bring-to-appearance any of the horror that 
the re-visiting of these images now invokes. it is only in the incongruous listing of the 
various architectural styles chosen for the camps, presented almost as though it were 
a lesson in real estate ‘alpine style, garage style, Japanese style, no style’, that we begin 
to understand that the failure to form a consistent envelope proper-to the appearing 
of the camps is not simply due to a current disjunction of worlds. rather, it signals an 
operating logic which deliberately sought to efface that appearance, building facades, 
semblances that present a transcendental that mimics that of its rural context, an act 
that testifies to the ‘imagination’ of the designers, who indeed had the ability to envisage 
‘gates to be passed through only once’, and the callous foresight to design them as part 
of the ‘tranquil landscape’, such that the atrocity remained screened, having a nil value 
of appearance within the larger world of the german people. to put this differently, the 
very fact that the various styles of the camps are all included within the larger matrix of 
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representation that constitutes the german state of the situation, enabled the prevention 
of the ‘appearing’ of the camps as such: at the time, they ex-sisted as an undetermined 
generic set without a unifying predicate to make them identifiable.
the documentary’s meditation on the destitution of subjectivity maps the descent 
from singularity to the de-humanized dissemination of parts, devoid of particularity: the 
deliberate attempt to erase the being-there, or appearing of a whole section of humanity. 
to trace this, we must first review the identity laws, which consist of three categorical 
prescriptions for stabilizing a universe. For every object ‘a’ there is an identical arrow 
id(a) associated with it, i.e. a map in which the domain and codomain are the same set A, 
and for each a in a, f  (a) = a is called an identity map, written ia.
2 Badiou remarks that 
the identity arrow is a ‘neutral element’ in the operation of an arrow composition. the 
identity map is also known as an ‘endomap’, as its compositional map is internal, leading 
Badiou to equate it with the ‘null action of the One’s minimal power’ (tO 14-52, 146), 
or the inertia of reflexive relations that function as a stopping point. 
the tautological composition of the identity map is contrasted with the expression 
of ‘the same’ extrinsically, or isomorphically. unlike in set theory (on the ontological 
level) in which we determine two sets (or multiples) to be identical if they have the same 
elements, otherwise they are absolutely distinct, category theory admits degrees of re-
lation. two objects are said to be categorically indiscernible if there is a reversible (or 
isomorphic) arrow connecting them. this means that logically the same set of relations 
hold for each object. however, there remains the possibility of cancelling an inversion, 
which in itself identifies each object as literally distinct, although within the map they 
are identical—a formal, relational judgement. 
this definition is added to the laws of composition and association to generate the 
definition of a group within category theory: ‘a group is a category that has a single 
object in which every arrow is an isomorphism’ (tO 14). thus, a group comprises an 
object that is identified purely by the anonymity of a letter and the set of morphisms that 
are associated with it, or ‘the set of the different ways in which object-letter g is identi-
cal to itself ’ (tO 149). Where set-theory looks at the ordering of elements to determine 
identity between sets, in category theory the ‘elements’ are arrows, the operations map-
ping a composition, not the objects upon which it operates—indeed the object is the 
2. F. W. lawvere and s. h. schanuel, Conceptual Mathematics: A First Introduction to Categories, cambridge, 
cambridge university press, 199, p. 15.
. 1) two arrows following one another make up a composition, or to put this differently, if we have an ar-
row ‘f ’ that links a to its codomain b, and a second arrow ‘g’ that has b as its domain, and c as its codomain, 
then we can state that object a is linked to c (by g o f—expressed as ‘g following f ’). the two maps repre-
sented by the arrow and its respective domain and codomain produce a composite map written:
f    g
 a → B → c.
2) the associative law, which shows that 
 f o (g o h) = (f o g) o h
(and thereby allows us to leave out the parentheses and just write ‘ h o g o f, or ‘h following g following f ’). cf. 
lawvere and schanuel, Conceptual Mathematics: A First Introduction to Categories, p. 15.
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point of inertia, or neutral element that offers zero information, other than tautological 
self-evidence. We are clearly offered a different perspective on ‘identity’—rather than 
the repetition of the same, we have a plurality of active ways of producing the same, the 
configurations via which it isomorphically manifests itself as the same. Badiou theorizes 
this via reference to the platonic dialectical relation between the same and the Other: 
whereas the identity endomap conforms to a mimetic relation, the activity of the iso-
morphisms perform a ‘specular’ relation as the reversibility of each arrow that claims 
two literally distinct elements as logically the same performs a doubling, a pair of sym-
metrical identifications that, when taken simultaneously, collapse back into the inertia 
of the endomap.
in rethinking identity in this categorical manner, we see how the being-there of an 
essent is determined not by the composition of its fixed properties (i.e. the ordering of 
its elements, which comprise its ontological being) but through to its active self-produc-
tion which ‘gives’ its identity via the combination of relations it entails. difference is 
not absolute, since the identity arrows are caught up within a network of same/Other 
relations, but a question of degree—and here we are close to deleuze’s notion of intensi-
ties. these areas of convergence between same/other are not simply points of mimetic 
similarity between distinct essents (shared elements, such as the null set that is common 
to all constructed sets) but active relations that produce the identities of the two domains 
that are joined by the isomorphic arrows. since these relations are not derived from 
fixed attributes but comprise active links that produce connections of sameness and dif-
ference, we can see how a situation is fluid, and yet rigorously structured.
relating this back to the operational logic of the camps as portrayed in resnais’ 
documentary, we can note the deliberate attempt to erase the differential of appear-
ances, as each inmate is stripped of any external marker that might distinguish them. 
this descent from ontological singularity, to the erasure of onto-logic appearing, is por-
trayed in the film as a passage from family groups, lingering close-ups of individual faces 
prior to their boarding the trains, to the sealing off of carriages as prelude to the ultimate 
concealment of appearance in the camp. Within the confines of the camp we no longer 
see images of ‘whole’ people, the fragmentation of identity is signalled by the de-subjec-
tivized close-ups of the different body parts that are regulated, disciplined, upon arrival 
—naked, tattooed, numbered, and shaved—operations that do not seem to happen to 
someone. all inmates appear with a similar, minimum degree of intensity, or lack of ap-
pearance, since differentiation itself is systematically effaced. 
the effacement of identity can be thought of as severing, or restricting, the multiple 
relations via which an individual constitutes the identity. in being reduced to just one 
more name, or number, meticulously recorded in a register, identity ceases to be inter-
relational, and is restricted to the minimal tautological relation that Badiou equates with 
the inertia of the One, the pure inscription that opens the place for an essent to appear, 
without allowing any dialectic between self/other to modulate the relational intensity 
with which an ontological singularity manifests the diversity and variety of its situated 
appearing. this inertia in effect is the minimum degree of self-relation that produces a 
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limited identity, or fixes the being-there within a localized world as merely ‘countable’. 
this minimal inscription of presence/absence is emphasized in the film by the 
many ways in which the prisoners are systematically ‘erased’ from the registers. the 
‘closed universe’ of the camp enters into relation with a simulacrum of the germanic 
world beyond its gates, having a hospital, but one in which all illness is reduced to a 
single ailment, the ‘same ointment for every disease’, or ‘treatment’ is in fact ‘death by 
syringe’. suffering is homogenized ‘in the end each inmate resembles the next, a body 
of indeterminate age that dies with its eyes open’—even death, that which gives beings 
their singularity, is reduced to a process in which there remains no ‘i’ to die, only the 
endless dying of ‘someone’; again, the degree of visibility of all apparents is negated 
such that even death fails to register as a singularizing event. counter to this hospital 
in which all patients receive the same degree of inattention, we have the surgical block 
where the patients receive an inordinate degree of surveillance, becoming guinea pigs 
for pointless, grotesque operations, testing grounds for drugs, or simply a focus for idle 
experimentation. the well equipped surgeries here are not to heal the body, but pro-
duce deviant variations, new modes of appearing that violate the laws of nature and the 
humanity of the victim. 
Once identity is reduced to the minimum inscription of place, number, one would 
imagine that no further destitution were possible. however, the imperative of the Final 
solution provoked nazi ingenuity to take the mania for dismantlement even further: the 
total effacement of the appearing of the Jewish prisoners is undertaken via the methodi-
cal dissemination into parts. that all elements that combined to produce the singularity 
of an individual were methodically stripped away we have already established, however, 
the perverse extent of this process that demanded the cataloguing and storing of all these 
dismembered attributes speaks to a desire to mutilate the identity of the prisoner beyond 
any possible recognition or recuperation. Footage from the nazi warehouses depicts 
vast piles of confiscated property—the corollary of the ‘properties’ of each individual 
that were shed. piles of clothes, dusty and moth eaten; mountains of odd shoes, specta-
cles, carelessly piled up, indifferent to scratches; combs, shaving equipment, the intimate 
debris of particular lives, separated out into their disparate elements and formed into a 
new, amorphous multiple, constructed of a single element that is reiterated to the nth 
degree, a magnitude of such scale that their original value, or use becomes lost, their 
specific features blurred in the sheer incomprehensible volume of which they are an in-
discernible element —who is to re-use these mouldy shaving brushes, or pick out a par-
ticular cracked pair of reading glasses? surely the point is not the thrifty cataloguing and 
re-cycling of resources, but the dismantlement of a section of humanity to its minimum 
parts, an operation Badiou terms ‘immanent dissemination’ whereby the elements that 
comprise an element are further broken down into their sub-elements, an extrapolation 
of relation, to its limit point—to the point at which the original being loses all particu-
larity, being denuded of property, and the sub-elements themselves are re-configured to 
form infinitely large multiplicities that extend beyond any imaginable capacity to think 
their individual use. each item is placed in a context where there is no possibility of it 
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retaining its intrinsic personal value, as operated in relation to its original context. thus, 
even the smallest elements are reduced in their appearing to an absolute minimum. 
in category theory, the logical operation of negation derives from the relation of 
dependence. as we saw with the zero-value of a being that does not appear within a 
world, this lack of relation is not understood as a simple negation, but is linked to the 
envelope or the synthesizing transcendental, such that it has a value in the world—it 
inappears—rather than functioning as a hole, or break in the fabric of its continuity. 
this insight is generalized to produce a logic of negation. rather than restricting our 
operation to a single element that accords to the minimum degree of appearance, we 
can deduce whole sections, or envelopes that belong to a world, but are unrelated to 
other envelopes. thus, if we construct the envelope that centres around the initial be-
ing-there of an apparent we are also able to construct a set, or envelope of those beings, 
or elements, with which it has zero (or minimum) relation, and within this set we can 
again extract the measure that synthesizes this collective being-there for this separate 
part of the world. this provides a measure of the reverse of our former situation. 
We shall call ‘reverse’ of the degree of appearance of a being-there in a world, 
the envelope of that region of the world comprising all the beings-there whose 
conjunction with the first has a value of zero (the minimum).4
Badiou stresses that it is of particular significance that the logical operation of negation 
occurs as a result of the transcendental parameters (minimality, conjunction and the en-
velope) and is not a meta-structural condition imposed from without.
this mania of effacement and control reaches its zenith in the nazi hoarding of the 
hair of the shaved camp women. here we have the material link between property as 
possession and property as attribute. not only are the women made anonymous, sexless 
via the humiliating act of being shorn, but the markers of their individuality and free-
dom is retained and amassed, forming an shapeless billowing mass of curls and tangles, 
impossible to take in as the camera pans across the expanse of the warehouse show-
ing acres of hair, a quantity so expansive that there is no other contextualizing feature 
within the frame to help the viewer to comprehend what they are seeing. here surely is 
the height of redundancy, a dismantling that exceeds sense.
But no, the documentary transitions to its final phase, where it traces the logic of in-
appearing from the attempt to deny visibility, difference, to its actual transformation—
its appearing-as-other. the shapeless hair becomes neat bales of cloth, stacked ready for 
the practical german hausfrau, the recalcitrant skeletons that withstood the fires of the 
crematorium are re-cycled as fertilizer, bodies yield up fat to produce soap, and even 
skin is re-used as paper: one of the fluttering scraps that testify to this has, ironically, a 
beautiful female face drawn upon it—a grotesque inscription of lack at the very site of 
the inexistent whose absence it attests. in focusing on this literal inappearance of the 
Jews within the german situation, resnais seeks to discuss the wider problem of think-
ing the real of the holocaust. While the very use of document, of historical footage, to 
4. Badiou, ‘the transcendental’, p. 214.
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construct his argument might suggest that, on the contrary, the reality is all to evident, 
the closing sequence of the film underlines its continuing resistance to being thought. 
the universal denial of responsibility extends beyond the depicted post-war trials, ironi-
cally implicating the work of art itself, as its release for distribution (so resnais tells us5) 
was contingent upon the erasure of a French soldier’s cap, shown supervizing the depor-
tation of the Jews. in answer to the closing question ‘Who is responsible?’ even ten years 
later, the answer continued to be no one. in submitting to the change and remarking it, 
resnais remains faithful to his artistic conviction which demands that he inscribe the 
impossibility of the bringing-to-appearance of the inexistent within the current state of 
the situation—ontological impossibility proper, but in parallel with the onto-logic (as 
here, the crassly political) level.
so long as we consider ‘appearing’ within a traditional (‘vulgar’) phenomenological 
framework, we can leverage only indirectly, through allegory, category theory’s ability 
to map the logic of appearing within the diegetic frame. the real strength of category 
theory is its independence from phenomenology, from the centering consciousness of 
the subject, from the parameters of space and time. this makes category theory a par-
ticularly attractive tool for mapping the site of subtractive truth(s) in the field of art, for 
discussing works of art purely in terms of their ‘in-appearing’, and in terms of their rela-
tion with truth, and the character of that truth. in closing, we may consider some words 
of chris marker, another thinker of the generic, that ‘truth is not the destination, but 
perhaps it is the path’6—and where documentary truth is at stake, it is perhaps even 
more explicitly the procedure, rather than the constructed artefact.
lindsey hair 
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